

Critical Airport Infrastructures: Cyber-attacks & Counter-Drone Technologies

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


Georgia Lykou

Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority &
Athens University of Economics & Business

Unmanned Aircraft Systems and their intrusion into our daily activities (UAS/UAV/RPAS/Drones)

UAV: Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles
RPAS: REMOTE PILOT AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS



Source: GAO illustration of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) information. | GAO-18-110

Rules and guidance for drone operation

Know Before You Fly

DO:
FLY YOUR
UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT
BELOW
400 FEET



DO:
FLY WITH
LOCAL
CLUBS



DO:
INSPECT
YOUR
AIRCRAFT
BEFORE
YOU FLY

DO:
TAKE A
LESSON
BEFORE
YOU FLY



<https://www.easa.europa.eu/domains/civil-drones-rpas>

DON'T:
FLY YOUR
UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT
BEYOND
LINE OF
SIGHT



DON'T:
FLY NEAR
AIRPORTS
OR ANY
MANNED
AIRCRAFT



DON'T:
FLY NEAR
PEOPLE
or
STADIUMS



DON'T:
BE CARELESS
or
RECKLESS.
YOU COULD
BE FINED
IF YOU
ENDANGER
PEOPLE
OR OTHER
AIRCRAFT



DON'T:
FLY ANYTHING
THAT WEIGHS
MORE THAN
55 LBS.

DON'T:
FLY FOR
PAYMENT
or
COMMERCIAL
PURPOSES
UNLESS
SPECIFICALLY
AUTHORIZED
BY THE FAA



Rules and guidance for drone operation

New EU-wide rules for drones from 2021

The new EU rules ensure that the following are respected:



safety



privacy



data protection



environment

<https://www.easa.europa.eu/domains/civil-drones-rpas>

Upon request of the owner of the artificial obstacle

 **EASA**
European Union Aviation Safety Agency



<https://uas.hcaa.gr/Faq>



How vital is a UAS risk?

The U-Space Environment

The top three issues of concern about commercial drones among the public:

41%


risk of improper use

27%

risk of use by criminals

26%

risk of accident



Reconciling 3 different roles

- Regulation



- Industry / technology



- Attackers



Categorizing UAS: Related Cyber-threats



- Disabling adversary networks through local interference
- Harvesting adversary credentialing information
- Data collection and probing

- Spoofing of law enforcement UAS to misrepresent location information or collected probe data
- Take-down, lock-out, or takeover of law enforcement UAS
- Theft of UAS identity, network, or collected probe data



- Botnet-style stealth network infection enabled by mobile UAS and poorly protected personal WiFi networks
- Cascading infection of Internet of Things (e.g., home appliances, lightbulbs, car-charging stations) spread through mobile UAS

- Distorting or destroying collected probe data
- Take-down, lock-out, or takeover of adversarial UAS

UAS as cyber weapons

UAS as cyberattack targets

Communication attack on ATM systems

Attack Scenario to Airport facilities

Day 1

Step 1: UAV inspects and records CIs location and vulnerabilities (Navigational Aids, Com-transceivers or Radar)



RSR/MSSR
Radar



Com Transceiver

Air Traffic Management
Unmanned Stations

Day X


Step 2: UAV attacks CI by:

- 1) Carrying explosive payload
- 2) Emitting interference signal




Air Traffic Management
Unmanned Station

How to protect ATM & Airport facilities?




Communication attack on ATM systems

Attack Scenario to Airport facilities



How to protect ATM & Airport facilities?

Airport and Supporting Critical Infrastructures Layout




C-UAS Technologies


Receive a signal at the antenna



Combine signal position with video image



Visualize the drone signal in the video image



Sensor



Antenna

Video Camera

Fiber Optic Cable etc.

Monitoring

Control Terminal



Detected image

Drone arrival direction

Detecting range



Drone arrival direction map display

Lights up when drone is detected

Search mode select (Manual/Auto)

Buzzer ON / OFF

Installation position

Video Display

(Able to display a maximum of 6 images from each sensor)

History event display /

Spectrum display

Countering rogue drones



COUNTER-DRONE WORKFLOW AND SOLUTIONS

Detect, Track & Identify



Sensors:



Acoustic



Visual/EO



Thermal



Radio Frequency (HF, VHF, UHF)



Radar

React



Non-interactive¹ Response:



Drone Alarms



Close Window Blinds



Shut Down Wi-Fi



Evacuate an Area



Deploy a Fog Grenade



Blind the Drone Camera

Interdict



Kinetic Solutions:



Laser



Projectiles



Net

Non-Kinetic Solutions:



RF/GNSS Jamming



RF/GNSS Spoofing

¹ Threat responses which do not interact with the drone in any way but can actively or passively mitigate the threat it poses
source: DRONEII.com


Counter-Drone Systems & Airport's applicability

Is the airport operator permitted to operate detection & mitigation technologies for UAS?




Careless, Clueless, Criminal or Terrorist Drone Disrupting Airport Activity

FORTEM SKYDOME™
• Comprehensive Coverage
• Powerful, Easy Management
• Safe Mitigation Options



Epilogue: Aiming to Cyber-Resilient Aviation

Comprehensive, unified responses with the world's top-class combination of physical security and cyber security



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